Efficient resource allocation is challenging when privacy of users is important. Distributed approaches have recently been used extensively to find a solution for such problems. In this paper, the efficiency of two distributed resource allocation approaches, AIMD algorithm and competition, is studied and compared. To this end, the resource allocation is defined as a total utilitarianism problem that is an optimization problem of sum of users utility functions subjected to capacity constraint. First, the stochastic AIMD algorithm is derandomized and its efficiency is compared with the stochastic version. Then, the algorithm is improved to allocate subsidized goods to users with concave and nonmonotonic utility functions as well as users with Sigmoidal utility functions. Finally, the problem is modeled as a competition game to evaluate the efficiency properties of unique equilibrium when resource allocation parameters change. To illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed solutions, simulation results is presented for a public renewable-energy powered charging station in which the electric vehicles (EVs) compete to be recharged.
I. INTRODUCTION
In many real-world applications, the goal is allocating scarce resources among n users in order to achieve maximum total utility so-called total utilitarianism. The concept of the utility here represents the satisfaction level of each user from the allocated resources. It normally leads to solve an optimization problem that the objective function is the sum of users utility functions subjected to capacity and other constraints. Mathematically speaking, let x i and u i denote each user i's allocated resource and utility function respectively, and C > 0 denotes the capacity limit, we have maximize x1,...,xn
The problem arises when each user's utility function u i and number of user involved in resource allocation problem are unknown and reaching to capacity constraint n i=1 x i ≤ C is just informed by a notification. To solve the optimization problem given by (1) , there are two main solution approaches: centralized and distributed.
978-1-5386-5959-5/18/$31.00 ©2018 IEEE Centralized solutions are more efficient since users first admit their individual utility functions to a decision maker, which then solves the optimization problem to find the optimal allocated resources. However, users utility functions are private information and the drawback is that users' privacy protections is challenged. Distributed allocation is a key concept to resolve this conundrum, i.e., to efficiently allocate resources while preserving privacy. In distributed resource allocation, a set of users must autonomously assign their resources with respect to certain criteria and the main goal is to reach the global optimum.
To model different problems, we need to approximate each user's satisfaction with a suitable utility function. We consider three following cases. First, for allocation of common goods, where users do not pay a fee per use, we adopt concave and strictly increasing utility functions, since it provides mathematical tractability [3] however limits its applicability. Second, for allocation of subsidized goods, where the fee per use is shared with the entire population, each user payoff function is defined as the difference between the user utility function and the cost of received resources. Therefore, considering concave and strictly increasing utility functions, users payoff functions are concave and nonmonotonic. Third, consider allocation of goods that are only useful in sufficient quantities. Herein, each user's satisfaction ideally described by a discontinuous Step function that we approximate with a continuous Sigmoidal utility function [1] .
Example 1 (EV Charging). Imagine a charging station of Electric Vehicles (EVs) whose power supplies from renewable energy (e.g., solar, wind). Such stations have limited available resources and demand for these finite amounts of energy is also increasing. The users are EV owners who connect their vehicles to the charging station, and intuitively some of users need their vehicles more than others (e.g., the handicapped, elderly, and parents with young kids to pick-up after work). A private utility function determines the level of satisfaction for each EV owner whose EV is connected to the station to be charged. As the demand for the resource overwhelms the capacity, every individual who consumes an additional unit directly harms others who can no longer enjoy the benefits. However, since the return of EVs to charging station is nondeterministic, it seems reasonable to assume that EV owners are greedy and prefer to charge their own EVs regardless of others due to avoid range anxiety. The users' utility functions are chosen normalized logarithmic to represent strictly increas- Step utility function f i and corresponding approximate continuous Sigmoidal utility function w i . ing concave functions as well as Sigmoidal to approximate
Step functions.
In this paper, we propose a distributed and iterative algorithm, which leads to a computationally efficient and private solution of the resource allocation problems. We employed the algorithm for specific applications and we present the following contributions.
• A derandomized version of the algorithm is proposed in order to allocate common goods to users with strictly increasing, concave utility functions. • The algorithm is adopted to allocate subsidized goods, where the fee per use is shared with the entire population, to users with concave and nonmonotonic utility functions. • The extended variant of the algorithm is proposed to allocate common goods to users with Sigmoidal utility functions. • Finally, we prove that our result of AIMD resource allocation of common goods where users utility functions are strictly increasing, concave is close to the stable result of Nash equilibrium in game theoretic approach.
II. DISTRIBUTED RESOURCE ALLOCATION In this section, we formally define resource allocation problem using utility function concept for both centralized and distributed solution approaches. The objective is to determine each user's optimal allocated resource at which maximum total utility is achieved.
In real life applications, the resource could be time-slotted like energy in kWh or time-varying like power in kW. Although, we consider a time-slotted optimization problem, we can use the proposed solution for any timevarying situations without changing the results.
A. Baseline and Problem Formulation
Consider n users utilize a shared limited resource C > 0, and let x i ≥ 0 represents the possible allocated resource to each user i = 1, . . . , n. We attribute a utility, i.e., a measure of satisfaction, to each user i who takes advantage of the common resource and describe it by means of a utility function. The utility function u i : R + → R + , assigns a non-negative real number to each possible value of allocated resource x i , to represent the level of satisfaction for each user i or quality of service (QoS). A class of centralized resource allocation problems can be formulated as a nonlinear continuous optimization problem (1) that is also represented in Figure 2a . In such problems, a central decision maker calculates the optimal solution, by collecting all information regarding each user's utility function u i , capacity constraint C, and number of users n. Although centralized solution approaches focus to determine efficient resource allocation, in many realistic applications, it is neither applicable nor desirable [21] since it violates users' privacy. Figure 2 (b) depicts a class of distributed (and iterative) approach to resource allocation problems in which allocations emerge as the result of an iterative of local procedures. In other words, a set of users locally make decisions regarding their resources autonomously. To this end, an algorithm is used to assign each user i an allocated resource x i (t) in time steps (iterations) 1, . . . , t. In each iteration, each user's algorithm update user's allocated resource x i (t) locally by choosing one of these options: increase, decrease or no-change compared with previous iteration x i (t − 1). The increase option continues until receiving one bit signal s(t − 1), that notify capacity constraint n i=1 x i (t) > C is violated and algorithm, based on a certain probability, choose one of the following options: decrease or no-change. When the capacity is available again n i=1 x i (t) ≤ C, the increase option of the algorithm restarts immediately. The procedure repeats until the number of iterations is large enough t, and users' allocated resource converge to the optimal allocation x * . In order to quantify efficiency of distributed resource allocation, we express the efficiency as follows:
where the numerator is the output of proposed distributed algorithm and the denominator is the solution of an interiorpoint optimization algorithm.
III. AIMD ALGORITHM
In this section, we describe several variants of AIMD algorithm. AIMD (Additive Increase Multiplicative Decrease) is a distributed and iterative algorithm that composed of two phases. In the additive increase (AI) phase, users continuously request for more available resource of the network until receiving a notification that the aggregate amount of available resource has been exceeded. Then the multiplicative decrease (MD) phase occurs and users respond to the notification by reducing their share proportionally. The AI phase of the algorithm restarts again immediately and this pattern is repeated by each active user in the network [6] . For the sake of coherence, we reintroduce the stochastic statedependent version of AIMD algorithm [30] , that is used for allocation of common goods among users with concave and strictly increasing utility functions and hereinafter we call it AIMD Algorithm. The AIMD algorithm considers a further and substantial assumption, so-called concavity assumption, for users utility functions which provide mathematical tractability of optimization problem (1).
Assumption 1. (Concavity Assumption)
The utility functions u i : R + → R + , (i) are strictly increasing functions of x i with u i (0) = 0, (ii) are concave and continuously diffrentiable with domain x i ≥ 0, where x i is the amount of resources allocated to user i.
A. Derandomized Algorithm
The proposed stochastic AIMD Algorithm is considered to have access to sources of perfect randomness, i.e. unbiased and completely independent random variables, however in real-world implementation, the physical sources of randomness to which we have access may contain biases and correlations [29] . Thus, the probabilistic method can also yield insight into how to construct deterministic algorithms [22] . We now propose a variant of deterministic AIMD, DAIMD Algorithm 1, for the same purpose. We show Algorithm 1 DAIMD for user i 1: Initialize x i (0) arbitrary 2: Broadcast the parameter Γ 3: for time steps t = 1, 2, 3, . . . do
4:
if n j=1 x j (t) < C then 5:
8:
end if 10: end for that the strong convergence of derivative of utility function of long-term average allocated resource u ′ i (x i (t)), can be used to allocate resource optimally. Therefore, there exists a derandomized algorithm with the same performance as the randomized algorithm.
B. Subsidized Goods
We extend resource allocation problem to subsidized goods where the fee per use is shared with the entire population. Suppose if each user i is charged a constant price L per unit of the received resources x i . Each user payoff function, v i : R + → R + is defined as utility function minus the cost of received resource as follows:
Recall each user utility function u i (x i ) is considered under Concavity Assumption 1, therefore, each user payoff function (3) is a concave function but it is not necessarily increasing.
The centralized resource allocation problem can then be formulated as follows:
The optimization problem 4 in which the objective function is non-negative sum of concave functions, is concave and there exists a global optimal solution [3] .
Example 2 (EV Charging revisited). We model the level of satisfaction of EV owners in example 1 by normalized logarithmic function u i (x i ) = 100 log(1+ηixi) log(1+ηiχi) , where χ i in kWh is the amount of allocated resource (EV charging) that gives 100 unit utility to the user i. The parameter η i indicates how the charge needed urgently by effecting on the rate of utility percentage that is a function of allocated resource x i . The cost of allocated energy is defined as the price of energy L in monetary units, multiply in energy allocation x i . Therefore, the payoff function is defined as: We improve AIMD Algorithm by controlling the allocation do not exceed from maximum payoff of each user and design the PAIMD Algorithm 2. The control is applied locally since each user i calculates the optimal point x * i = arg max xi∈R+ v i (x i ), ∀i = 1, . . . , n and then in each iteration, in the (AI) phase of the algorithm compare it to allocated resource x i (t)+α to choose the minimum allocation. if n j=1 x j (t) < C then 6:
end if 11: end for
C. Sigmoidal Utility Functions
In this section, we model resource allocation problem (1) using Sigmoidal users utility functions. if n j=1 x j (t) < C then 6:
7:
x i (t + 1) = x i (t) otherwise; 8: else 9:
x i (t + 1) = max(0 , x i (t) − α) In some situations, such as charging an electric vehicle with the goal of reaching a predetermined destination (e.g., airport, home, etc.), the user receive negligible (or non) utility until a threshold of resource is reached (e.g., enough electric charge to arrive at the destination). Ideally, the best description of the utility function is through a discontinuous Step function as follows:
where θ i shows the sufficient allocated resource that gives 100 unit utility to user i.
Continious Sigmoidal utility functions may be used to approximate a step utility function to any arbitrary accuracy [28] . Thus, we model EV owner's satisfaction with Sigmoidal utility function that is expressed by:
where η i is the steepness of the curve that indicates how the charge is needed urgently for each user i. The parameter ψ i in kWh is the inflection point that achieving it satisfies the urgent need of user i. The function, also, satisfies w i (0) = 0 and lim xi→+∞ w(x i ) ≈ 100. Figure 1 represents a Step utility function f i with θ i = 48 and an approximate corresponding Sigmoidal utility function w i with η i = 0.15 and ψ i = 45 .
The QAIMD Algorithm 3 represents the procedure of allocation among users with Sigmoidal utility functions. The key point is that in each iteration (t), the long-term of allocated resourcex i (t) is compared with each user i's inflection point ψ i . Ifx i (t) < ψ i , the increase phase is built by multiplying the previous state x i (t) in a growth factor 1 β > 1 to construct current state x i (t + 1) with a probability λ i (x i (t)) = Γ 1
xi(t) . The decrease phase also is made by subtracting α from the previous state. Whenx i (t) ≥ ψ i , the algorithm is work with AIMD Algorithm procedure. Note that there are two parameters Γ 1 , Γ 2 to ensure 0 < λ i (x i ) < 1 in each case.
IV. SIMULATION
The AIMD parameters are identical for all users with α = 1 and β = 0.85. The parameter Γ is also chosen to assure us the condition λ i (x i ) ∈ (0, 1) is satisfied. First, we adopt normalized logarithmic utility function u i (x i ) = 100 log(1+ηixi) log(1+ηiχi) , as a strictly increasing concave function which satisfies Concavity Assumption 1. We choose χ i independent uniformly distributed random number with support (40, 60) and η i independent uniformly distributed random number with support (0, 1). We apply deterministic DAIMD Algorithm 1 for allocation of power as a common good (no charging fee) to EVs connected to the charging station. Figure 3a shows a rapid convergence for derivative of payoff functions u ′ i (x i (t)) when iteration t increases. It also reveals the coincidence of deterministic and stochastic versions of derivative of payoff functions u ′ i (x i (t)). Figure 3b depicts the value of long-term average statex i (t) for two randomly selected users and shows each of them converge to a stable value. It also represents that deterministic and stochastic version of average statex i (t) fluctuate differently but the long-term averages for each user converge to optimal allocation. The efficiency of deterministic DAIMD Algorithm 1, calculated by Equation (2), in different runs are a real number in the range of (0.97, 0.99). We also apply stochastic PAIMD Algorithm 2 for allocation of power as a subsidized good to EVs connected to charging station. Therefore, we consider the price per unit L ∈ {0.1, 0.2, . . . , 1} of the power x i in the payoff function (5) . Figure 4 , depicts the efficiency of PAIMD Algorithm 2 compared with AIMD Algorithm, both calculated by Equation (2). Fig. 3 : (a) The deterministic derivative of payoff function u ′ i (x i (t)) for two randomly selected users (solid lines) compared with corresponding stochastic ones (dashed lines). It illustrates both deterministic and stochastic derivatives approach rapidly to zero as t increases, (b) the deterministic average of allocated resourcex i (t) to the stable point for two randomly selected users (solid lines) compared with corresponding stochastic ones (dashed lines). The efficiency of PAIMD Algorithm 2 decreases when the value of L increases until receiving to a minimum value in (L = 0.3). For large values of L > 0.3 the efficiency of PAIMD Algorithm 2 increases and converge to 1. Second, we model EV owner satisfaction with Sigmoidal utility function that are expressed by Equation (7) . We choose ψ i independent uniformly distributed random number with support (25, 100) and η i independent uniformly distributed random number with support (0, 25). The parameter Γ 1 and Γ 2 is also chosen to assure us the condition λ i (x i ) ∈ (0, 1) is satisfied. Figure 5a depicts the derivative of utility functions w ′ i (x i (t)) for six randomly selected users. It illustrates that the derivatives approach to zero as t increase but the convergence is slower than the derivatives of logarithmic utility function (2). Figure 3a . In Figure 5b the average of allocated resourcex i (t) for six randomly selected users is displayed. It showsx i (t) approach to a constant value for some users and to 0 for some other users. Figure 5c represents the efficiency of QAIMD 3, calculated by Equation (2), for different capacity C/Ψ = {0.5, 0.75, . . . , 3}, where Ψ = n i=1 ψ i . For each user i the algorithm decides between increasing allocated resource or decreasing it toward zero. The efficiency of the algorithm is better for small values of capacity constraint, but it decrease when capacity is around Ψ. The efficiency improve again when C/Ψ is large enough.
V. LOSS OF EFFICIENCY DUE TO COMPETITION
In this section, we allow the individual users to act strategically as in a game. We consider a game in strategic form, where all users' utility functions are common knowledge. The resulting competition over a scarce resource is reminiscent of the tragedy of the commons. An user may deviate from the AIMD algorithm and strategically request more resource in order to improve its payoff. Alternatively, an user may follow the AIMD algorithm but mispresent its utility function. However, we show that, in some situations, the AIMD outcome and the game's Nash equilibrium are close to each other.
A. Resource Allocation as a Strategic Game
Imagine a resource allocation problem in which there are n users, competing to utilize a scarce fixed common resource of C > 0. Each user i chooses his own consumption of resources x i from a set of action space
A profile of actions x = (x i , x −i ) describe a particular combination of actions chosen by all users, where x −i ∈ X −i is a specific possible of actions for all players who are not i. Consuming an amount x i ≥ 0 gives user i a benefit equal to u i (x i ) when n j=1 x j ≤ C and intuitively no other users benefits from i's choice. When x i increases or other users consume more resources so that n j=1 x j > C, the user get nothing u i (x i ) = 0 because additional requested resources are not provided. Then we define the payoff functionũ i (x i , x −i ) of a user i from a profile of actions x as
Where the utility function u i (x i ) is considered to be concave, strictly increasing, and continuously differentiable ,i.e., follows assumption 1. The strategic game (N , X i ,ũ i ) i∈N , that have infinitely many pure strategies but utility functions are not continuous, is discontinuous infinite strategic games. This problem should be consider precisely because it may lead to problem of nonexistence of unique Nash equilibrium.
B. Nash Equilibrium
To cut to the chase, the key notion to solve the strategic game (N , X i ,ũ i ) i∈N , is the Nash equilibrium, that is an outcome (a decision made by each player) such that no player can improve his individual payoff through an unilateral move. As stable situations, Nash equilibrium are often considered to be the expected outcomes from interactions. To solve for a Nash equilibrium we compute the best-response function correspondence for each player and then find an action profile for which all best-response functions are satisfied together.
To find a solution for Equation (8), we first write out each player i's best-response correspondence and we consider that given x −i , player i will want to choose an element in BR i (x −i ). Given x −i ∈ X −i each player i's best response is the difference between C and n j =i x j . If user i asks for more, then all users get nothing while if asks for less then he is leaving some resources unclaimed and therefore
Based on the best response correspondence, any profile of demands x i ∈ [0, C] that add up to C will be a Nash equilibrium. Hence, each player i is indifferent between all of his requests x i ∈ [0, C] and the game is just not blessed with a unique equilibrium and has an infinite number of equilibria. The obvious problem with multiple equilibria is that the players may not know which equilibrium will prevail. Hence, it is entirely possible that a non-equilibrium outcome results because one player plays one equilibrium strategy while a second player chooses a strategy associated with another equilibrium [4] . It turns out that resource allocation encounters conflict over scare resources that results from the tension between individual selfish interests and common good. This is stated the tragedy of the commons by Hardin in his seminal article [12] .
To solve this problem, we first need to bring back the continuity to the payoff function Equation (8) . Thus, we apply the resource allocation back-off condition n j=1 x j > C directly to the payoff function for each user i. We define a concave penalty function τ : R + → R + so that τ (0) = 1 and τ (C) = 0 and multiply it to the payoff function (8) . To generalize, we also consider each unit of resource costs L and we havẽ
Example 4 (Penalty function). Consider, for example, the concave penalty function τ (z) as follows:
where z = n j=1 x j and p ∈ N. Intuitively, τ (0) = 1 and τ (C) = 0. Figure 6 depicts some examples of concave penalty functions Equation (11) for p ∈ {1, 2, 4, 8}. Although the larger values of p reduce inefficiency of Nash equilibrium, however make calculations more complex. In EV charging, this function can be programmed to the charger and it works when the demand exceeds from capacity C. When payoff functions are continuous and concave, theorem 1 shows there exist a pure Nash equilibrium. Moreover, theorem 2, provides sufficient conditions for uniqueness of an equilibrium in games with infinite strategy sets.
Theorem 1. ( [7] , [10] , [8] ) An infinite strategic form game G = (N , X i , f i ) i∈N such that for each i ∈ G: (i) X i is compact and convex; (ii) f i (x i , x −i ) is continuous in x −i ;
(iii) f i (x i , x −i ) is continuous and concave (in fact quasi-concavity suffices) in x i . Then a pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists.
Theorem 2 (Theorem 1, [23] ). Consider a strategic form game G = (N , X i , f i ) i∈N . For all i ∈ G, assume that the action sets X i = {x i ∈ R mi |h i (x i ) ≥ 0}, where h i is a concave function, and there exists somex ∈ R mi such that h i (x i ) > 0 . Assume also that the payoff functions (f i ) i∈N are diagonally strictly concave for x ∈ X . Then the game has a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Where payoff functions (f i ) i∈N are diagonally strictly concave for x ∈ X, if for every x ne ,x ∈ X,
The game (N , X i ,ṽ i ) i∈N has unique Nash equilibrium that is calculated by maximizing user i's payoff functioñ v i (x i , x −i ) and finding the solution to the first order conditions. So, we write down the first-order condition of user i's payoff function as follows
We therefore have n such equations, one for each player, and the unique Nash equilibrium is the strategy profile x ne for which all users in the network, the Equation 12 are satisfied together, so that
When resource allocation problem form as a result of selfish competition among users, the resulting stable solution may not, in fact, be system optimal [19] . We measure inefficiency constituted due to decentralized control. This is very important to decide whether a decentralized mechanism can be applied, regarding the loss of efficiency in comparison with the performance that would be obtained with a central authority.
Price of anarchy (PoA) [16] , is a concept that quantifies this inefficiency and is measured as the ratio between the worst equilibrium and the centralized solution. Therefor, PoA is defined as the efficiency of the unique Nash equilibrium x ne of the game G = (N , X i , f i ) i∈N and the optimal centralized solution of (5) as follows:
C. Simulation
In this section, we proceed to simulate resource allocation in competition game to investigate in more details the inefficiency of Nash equilibrium. Each user's utility function is considered as the normalized logarithmic function with uniformly distributed random parameters of η i ∈ (0, 25) and χ i ∈ (25, 100). We also consider the concave penalty function Equation (11) with p = 1 for executing the simulation. Let the same setting in section IV for a charging station with n = 50 users. Figure 7 represents the price of anarchy in competition against two parameters of price and number of users. The PoA is so sensitive to number of users in the competition such that increasing number of users negatively affect on PoA. Moreover, if the selfish behavior of users in competition do not control by pricing, inefficiency increase and consequently the PoA decrease. Note that the price of anarchy is independent of the competition topology [24] . 
D. Related Work
In data networks in which the resource allocation problem leads to Network Utility Maximization (NUM), users utility functions are commonly considered to be concave, continuous and strictly increasing functions modeling elastic networks [15] , [25] . Many other applications require inelastic network that are more challenging, where non-concave or discontinuous utility functions need to be maximized. Inelastic networks studied in [18] , [9] , [11] and Sigmoidal programming algorithm is proposed in [28] . In [1] , using utility proportional fairness policy, both elastic and inelastic utility functions compared. There is also substantial literature on AIMD, the algorithm proposed in [5] and applied experimentally in [13] , as the most efficient-fair rate control in Internet applications. The efficiency and fairness of the AIMD algorithm investigated in [17] and a comprehensive review of the AIMD algorithm and its applications is collected in [6] . This work uses the result of [30] that used AIMD algorithm in stochastic framework for common goods resource allocation. A class of finite strategic-form game where each player has a finite action set and a discrete utility function is studied in [21] . In [16] , the concept of price of anarchy that is the idea of quantifying the inefficiency of selfish solutions using the framework of approximation, is introduced. In network resource allocation, the notion of price of anarchy is introduced to quantify efficiency loss in [14] . EV charging has been the most widely studied as an application of distributed resource allocation. In [2] , proposed a distributed control algorithm that adapts the charging rate of EVs to the available capacity of the network ensuring that network resources are used efficiently and each EV charger receives a fair share of these resources. In [27] , proposed a distributed AIMD based algorithm to allocate available power among connected EVs in order to maximize the utilization of EV owners in a range of situations. In [26] , they also used the same formalization framework to expand the modifications of the basic AIMD algorithm to charge EVs. In both articles they considered a fairness policy as a constraint. The effectiveness of AIMD at mitigating the impact of domestic charging of EVs on low-voltage distribution networks is investigated [20] .
VI. CONCLUSION
Our work represents a variety of AIMD-based distributed algorithms for efficient and private resource allocations in real life applications. In this paper, we have considered two type of users utility functions based on the application. First, strictly increasing concave functions to represent greediness of users, and second Sigmoidal functions to describe the utility from goods that are only useful in sufficient quantities. We have introduced a stochastic AIMD algorithm to allocate subsidized goods where users have concave and nonmonotonic utility functions. We have also proposed derandomized version of AIMD algorithm to allocate common goods to users with strictly increasing utility functions. Moreover, we have extended the results to propose the variant of AIMD algorithm to allocate common resource where users have Sigmoidal utility functions. Finally, we have shown that our result of AIMD resource allocation of common goods where users utility functions are strictly increasing, concave is close to the stable result of Nash equilibrium in game theoretic approach. The numerical results of EV charging have shown that the proposed algorithms lead to converge to the solution provided by centralized solution.
